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of endorsements when a person re-
news an insurance policy. -:-
- Mona E. Dajani
New Jersey Real Estate
Brokers Have a Duty to
Inspect and Warn
In Hopkins v. Fox & Lago Real-
tors, 625 A.2d 1110 (N.J. 1993), the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that a real estate broker conducting an
open house has a duty to inspect the
premises if given the opportunity. The
real estate broker must then warn pro-
spective buyers and visitors of any
dangerous conditions that are reason-
ably discoverable through an ordi-
nary inspection.
Camouflaged Step
On April 26, 1987, plaintiff, Emily
Hopkins, accompanied her son and
daughter-in-law to an open house con-
ducted by a real estate broker em-
ployed by defendant, Fox & Lago
Realtors. The realtor met the Hopkins
party and permitted them to inspect
the premises on their own. While her
son and daughter-in-law toured the
home's patio and grounds, Hopkins
waited in the family room. Upon
hearing the others re-enter the home
through the foyer, Hopkins attempted
to join them. She proceeded down the
hallway towards the foyer, but did not
see that a step led down from the
hallway into the foyer. Consequently,
Hopkins stumbled and fell, fracturing
her ankle. She brought suit against
the broker, claiming that the use of the
same vinyl flooring on both levels
camouflaged the step and that the bro-
ker had a legal duty to warn her of any
known risks or risks that a reasonable
inspection would have revealed.
The trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint, concluding that
the broker did not owe her any duty
with respect to the dangerous condi-
tion of the property. On appeal, how-
ever, the appellate court determined
that such a duty existed and reversed
the trial court.
The appellate court agreed with the
plaintiff's contentions that an open
house visitor resembled an invitee or
a business guest of the defendant.
Moreover, the court concluded that
the defendant broker was, in effect, a
functional occupier of the premises.
Having analogized the position of the
broker to that of a proprietor of the
home, the appellate court applied the
common law principle of premises
liability. Premises liability imposes
on the landowner a duty of reasonable
care to guard against any discoverable
dangerous conditions on her property
for the protection of her business
invitees.
The defendant broker appealed,
claiming that because a real estate
broker is not the actual owner or occu-
pier of the premises, but merely an
agent of the homeowner, the broker
does not owe a duty to inspect the
premises and warn invitees of any
dangerous conditions.
Supreme Court Finds Duty to
Inspect and Warn
The Supreme Court of New Jersey
upheld the appellate court's decision,
reversing the trial court's dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint and remanding
the matter for trial. In reaching its
decision, however, the court refused
to follow the appellate court's strict
application of the traditional common
law doctrine governing premises li-
ability. Rather, the court traced the
history of premises liability law, ar-
guing that as modern society has de-
veloped, so has the legal relationship
of people to property. As a result, the
court found that the rigid constructs
of traditional common law premises
liability could not adequately accom-
modate the legal relationship that ex-
ists between a broker and an open-
house visitor. Since any attempt to
classify the parties into the traditional
common law categories would be
strained and awkward, the court pre-
ferred a more flexible approach to
premises liability law.
The supreme court found that the
best way to determine whether a duty
existed was an inquiry into the fair-
ness and justice of imposing such a
duty in light of the actual relationship
between the parties. This inquiry in-
volved identifying and weighing sev-
eral factors, including "the relation-
ship of the parties, the nature of the
attendant risk, the opportunity and the
ability to exercise care, and the public
interest in the proposed solution."
The court noted that the broker was
authorized to invite visitors and offer
various professional services, includ-
ing his expertise with regard to the
marketability of the premises and the
physical features that affect market-
ability. Therefore, the court found
that implicit in the offering of such
services was the broker's familiarity
with the premises on which an open-
house visitor could reasonably rely.
Furthermore, the court found that the
broker received tangible economic
benefits from this relationship, includ-
ing the opportunity to earn commis-
sions and cultivate future clients.
Based on these findings, the court
concluded that the broker's invitation
to potential customers implied a com-
mensurate degree of responsibility for
the visitors' safety.
The defendant broker argued that
imposing a duty on brokers was unfair
because the homeowner is in the best
position to guard against unreason-
able dangers. The court agreed with
the defendant's contention that
homeowners have a pre-existing,
nondelegable duty to guard against
any reasonably discoverable defects.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that
a homeowner's pre-existing duty to
prevent any foreseeable harm to
invitees did not in any way affect the
broker's own duty because two par-
ties can possess similar duties with
respect to a third party. In defining
the scope of this newly created duty,
the court ruled that the relevant ques-
tions include: what risks to others a
reasonably prudent real estate broker
conducting an open house would fore-
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see; and what the broker would do
under those circumstances to forestall
that risk.
The court found it was highly fore-
seeable that visitors could be injured
by dangerous conditions while wan-
dering through an unfamiliar house.
Nonetheless, the court ruled that the
broker's duty to protect only included
warning visitors of any dangerous
physical features or conditions. These
conditions must be: 1) discoverable
only during an inspection to deter-
mine the marketability of the premises;
and 2) features that a visitor would
routinely examine during a tour of the
premises.
In addition, the court limited this
duty to circumstances where a broker
could reasonably inspect the premises.
Furthermore, the inspection must com-
port with customary standards outlined
by expert witnesses. The court empha-
sized that the duty to warn did not apply
to latent dangers that would not be re-
vealed during the course of such a rea-
sonable inspection.
Duty Comports with Public Policy
The court found that the imposi-
tion of this new duty did not create an
unreasonable economic burden upon
the broker's livelihood. First, the court
stated that it is reasonable and fair for
a broker to absorb the cost of conduct-
ing an inspection and giving warn-
ings, since the broker receives an eco-
nomic benefit from holding the open
house. Moreover, a broker could de-
mand contribution or indemnification
from the homeowner in the case of
shared liability for a visitor's injury.
Second, the court held that a broker
may be in a better position than the
homeowner to prevent injury during
an open house, since the broker could
anticipate any problems associated
with holding an open house. Finally,
the court noted that the imposition of
this liability would create an incen-
tive for the broker to prevent acci-
dents and minimize risks.
Justice Clifford Concurs
Justice Clifford concurred with the
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majority's opinion and did not see the
court's ruling as a "cataclysmic change
in the law." The justice stated that the
majority opinion rested on the well-
established test of negligence, which
bases duty on "what the reasonably
prudent person would foresee and do
under the circumstances." Clifford
was also careful to point out the lim-
ited scope of the court's decision: the
broker's duty only extends to pro-
spective buyers and visitors in the
context of open house tours.
The justice did, however, disagree
with the court's decision requiring
expert witnesses to establish the cus-
tomary standards governing the re-
sponsibility of a real estate broker in
an open-house setting. Clifford fa-
vored a general tort law approach,
holding the broker to a duty of reason-
able inspection prior to the arrival of
the visitors, to determine if there are
any reasonably discoverable dangers
which require warning.
Justice Garibaldi Dissents
In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Garibaldi vigorously criticized the
court's opinion as being expansive,
ambiguous, and vague. The justice
noted that the majority's decision
failed to set boundaries regarding the
extent of the new duty. Garibaldi also
pointed out that a broker may not
know what constitutes a dangerous
condition or what a warning require-
ment entails. The justice further ob-
served that a broker owes a fiduciary
duty to the owner. Consequently, if
the broker must disclose defects that
the seller does not want disclosed, a
conflict of interest may arise.
The dissenting justice further criti-
cized the majority's opinion for its
negative impact on public policy.
First, Garibaldi stated that the injured
party already had adequate remedy in
her claims against the homeowner and
the homebuilder. Second, the justice
noted that imposing such a duty cre-
ated an economic burden on the bro-
ker who must now purchase additional
liability insurance. To defray the cost
of insurance, the broker would simply
increase her commission. The net
effect would be an increase in the
asking price of homes. Finally,
Garibaldi observed that the majority's
decision not only would increase liti-
gation by adding an extra layer of
parties, but would also increase the
cost of buying and selling a home. .
- William Hahn
Corecio
Volume 6, Number 1 of the
Consumer Law Reporter case
summary Nobelman v. American
Savings Bank, 113 S.Ct. 2106
(1993).
The case summary mistakenly
stated that Section 1322(b)(2) of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code disallows
modification in specific instances
where (1) a creditor's only security
interest is that of the debtor's princi-
pal residence; (2) creditors hold unse-
cured claims; or (3) creditors' rights
of any class of claims are unaffected.
However, Section 1322(b) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code actually provides
that a debtor's Chapter 13 plan may
modify the rights of holders of se-
cured claims (except claims secured
only by a security interest in real prop-
erty). A plan may also modify the
rights of holders of unsecured claims,
or leave unaffected the rights of hold-
ers of any class of claims. U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(2). The Consumer Law Re-
porter apologizes for any confusion
the case summary may have caused.
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